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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
 
SMITH, Chief Judge. 
 Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. (“Tennessee Gas”) submitted 
applications to several federal and state agencies seeking 
approval to build an interstate pipeline project. One such 
agency is the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental 
Protection (“PADEP”),1 which issued a permit approving the 
                                                 
 1 A companion case, also before this panel, raises 
challenges to the United States Army Corps of Engineers. See 
Del. Riverkeeper Network v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 
17-1506 (3d Cir. 2017). 
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project. The petitioners, Maya van Rossum and Delaware 
Riverkeeper Network (collectively, “Riverkeeper”), argue that 
we lack jurisdiction to rule on its petition because PADEP’s 
order was not final. As to the merits, Riverkeeper challenges 
PADEP’s decision on the grounds that the agency made an 
erroneous “water dependency” finding and improperly rejected 
a “compression” alternative to the pipeline project. 
 We will exercise jurisdiction because PADEP’s decision 
was final. We will also uphold PADEP’s decision on the merits 
because the agency’s unique interpretation of water 
dependency is reasonable and worthy of deference. 
Furthermore, the agency considered and rejected the 
compression alternative for reasons that are supported by the 
record. We will therefore deny the petition for review. 
I 
 At issue is the so-called Orion Project—12.9 miles of 
pipeline looping that would transport 135,000 dekatherms of 
natural gas per day via Pennsylvania. Approximately 99.5% of 
the new pipeline would run alongside existing pipelines. 
 Full background information on the Orion Project is 
provided in a companion case, Delaware Riverkeeper Network 
v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, No. 17-1506 (3d Cir. 2017). 
For purposes of this opinion, we will focus on the aspects of 
the state administrative procedures at issue here. 
 Under the Natural Gas Act of 1938, the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) is the “lead agency” for 
evaluating interstate pipeline projects. 15 U.S.C. § 717n(b). As 
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a condition of FERC approval, the applicant is required to 
obtain any other state or federal licenses required by law. One 
such license is called a Water Quality Certification governed 
by Section 401 of the Clean Water Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1341. “A 
Water Quality Certification confirms that a given facility will 
comply with federal discharge limitations and state water 
quality standards.” Del. Riverkeeper Network v. Sec'y Pa. Dep’t 
of Envtl. Prot., 833 F.3d 360, 368 (3d Cir. 2016), as amended 
(March 24, 2017). “For activities affecting Pennsylvania 
waters, . . . Water Quality Certifications are issued by PADEP.” 
Id. at 369. 
 As a condition of obtaining a Water Quality Certification, 
PADEP requires applicants to obtain other state permits, 
including a Water Obstruction and Encroachment Permit 
issued under Pennsylvania’s Dam Safety and Encroachment 
Act and its implementing regulations, 25 Pa. Code Ch. 105. 
Those permits are commonly referred to as “Chapter 105 
permits.” 
 Chapter 105 gives special protection to “exceptional value” 
wetlands. Wetlands are considered to have exceptional value 
if, inter alia, they are located along a drinking water supply or 
serve as habitat for endangered species. See 25 Pa. Code 
§ 105.17(1). It is undisputed that the Orion Project would affect 
ten exceptional-value wetlands in Pike County and three in 
Wayne County. 
 PADEP cannot issue a Chapter 105 permit for a project 
affecting exceptional-value wetlands unless it certifies in 
writing that seven requirements are met. 25 Pa. Code 
§ 105.18a. Two are relevant here: 
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(2) The project is water-dependent. A project is 
water-dependent when the project requires 
access or proximity to or siting within the 
wetland to fulfill the basic purposes of the 
project. 
(3) There is no practicable alternative to the 
proposed project that would not involve a 
wetland or that would have less effect on the 
wetland, and not have other significant adverse 
effects on the environment. 
Id. § 105.18a(a)(2)–(3). 
 On September 20, 2016, PADEP issued a conditional Water 
Quality Certification for the Orion Project. Then, on February 
23, 2017, PADEP issued two Chapter 105 permits approving 
the Orion Project’s stream and wetland crossings—Permit Nos. 
E52-253 (Pike County) and E64-305 (Wayne County). In 
doing so, PADEP certified that the Orion Project “[i]s water 
dependent” and would be “the least environmentally damaging 
alternative.” JA 49, 180. 
 On March 10, 2017, Riverkeeper filed this petition for 
review. We granted Tennessee Gas’s motion to intervene on 
March 17, 2017. Riverkeeper filed a motion for an emergency 
stay, which this Court denied on April 7, 2017. Riverkeeper 
then filed a motion to expedite the case. We granted that motion 
on May 8, 2017. 
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II 
 The parties ask us to resolve two jurisdictional issues: 
(1) whether we may review nonfinal administrative orders 
under the Natural Gas Act; and (2) whether the petition was 
timely filed. We need not reach the first question. The agency 
decision at issue is final, and therefore jurisdiction would be 
proper under either interpretation of the Natural Gas Act. As 
for the second question, we conclude that the petition was 
timely filed. 
A 
 First, Riverkeeper argues that we lack jurisdiction because 
we may only review final orders, and PADEP’s order is not 
final until it has been reviewed by a separate administrative 
entity, Pennsylvania’s Environmental Hearing Board. 
Riverkeeper asks us to transfer the case to the Board.2 We 
conclude that jurisdiction is proper because PADEP’s order is 
final. 
1 
 Our jurisdiction is controlled by Section 19(d) of the 
Natural Gas Act, as amended in 2005. Where an interstate 
pipeline project is proposed to be constructed, see 15 U.S.C. 
                                                 
 2 Because we conclude that jurisdiction is proper, we 
need not address Riverkeeper’s request for a transfer. See 
McLaughlin v. Arco Polymers, Inc., 721 F.2d 426, 430 (3d Cir. 
1983); see also Moravian Sch. Advisory Bd. of St. Thomas, V.I. 
v. Rawlins, 70 F.3d 270, 276 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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§ 717f, this Court has “original and exclusive jurisdiction over 
any civil action for the review of an order or action of a . . . 
State administrative agency acting pursuant to Federal law to 
issue . . . any permit, license, concurrence, or approval . . . 
required under Federal law,” id. § 717r(d)(1). 
 In a recent precedential opinion, this Court exercised 
jurisdiction over a similar PADEP decision involving the 
“Leidy Line” pipeline project. Del. Riverkeeper, 833 F.3d 360. 
The petitioner, also Riverkeeper, challenged PADEP’s decision 
to issue a Water Quality Certification. This Court concluded 
that “the issuance of a Water Quality Certification is not purely 
a matter of state law” because the certification “is an integral 
element of the regulatory scheme established by the Clean 
Water Act.” Id. at 371. Thus, PADEP was “acting pursuant to 
Federal law” within the meaning of the Natural Gas Act. 15 
U.S.C. § 717r(d)(1). We also exercised jurisdiction over 
various permits issued by the New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection, even though some permits were 
“governed by state law rather than the Clean Water Act.” Del. 
Riverkeeper, 833 F.3d at 374. Because those state-law permits 
were, “in effect, a set of conditions” on obtaining approval 
under the Clean Water Act, id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d)), 
they were issued “pursuant to Federal law,” 15 U.S.C. 
§ 717r(d)(1). Likewise here, the Chapter 105 permits were 
conditions of federal approval and therefore were issued 
“pursuant to Federal law.” Id.; see Del. Riverkeeper, 833 F.3d 
at 386 (“Because the Chapter 105 Permit was a condition of 
the Water Quality Certification, it is inextricably intertwined 
with the Water Quality Certification.”). 
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 After the Leidy Line ruling, the First Circuit decided 
Berkshire Environmental Action Team, Inc. v. Tennessee Gas 
Pipeline Co., LLC, 851 F.3d 105 (1st Cir. 2017). Berkshire 
ruled on an issue that was not raised in the Leidy Line case: 
finality. 
 First, Berkshire held that § 717r(d)(1) includes an unstated 
finality requirement. Even though the statute does not use the 
word “final,” the First Circuit read that word into the statute 
based on the “strong presumption . . . that judicial review will 
be available only when agency action becomes final.” Id. at 
109 (quoting Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 778 (1983)); 
see also Columbia Riverkeeper v. U.S. Coast Guard, 761 F.3d 
1084, 1092 (9th Cir. 2014). But see Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. 
LLC v. Del. Riverkeeper Network, 921 F. Supp. 2d 381, 391 
(M.D. Pa. 2013).3 
 Second, Berkshire concluded that the particular agency 
decision at issue was not final. It evaluated “[t]he substance of 
the Massachusetts regulatory regime,” Berkshire, 851 F.3d at 
112, and concluded that the applicant (also Tennessee Gas) was 
required to go through an additional adjudicatory hearing 
                                                 
 3 But see also Energy Transfer Partners, L.P. v. 
F.E.R.C., 567 F.3d 134, 139 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Our court 
has long recognized that [§ 717r(b), governing appeals 
from FERC,] does not require that an order be a ‘final’ one[.]”); 
Atl. Seaboard Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 201 F.2d 568, 572 
(4th Cir. 1953) (“The commission argues that the order which 
we are asked to review is not a definitive or final order of the 
commission; but our power to review is not limited to final 
orders.”). 
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before the agency action would be ripe for review. Berkshire 
characterized the adjudicatory hearing as a continuation of “a 
single, unitary proceeding” that had not yet finally concluded. 
Id. 
 Although the Leidy Line case was procedurally similar to 
this one, the finality issue was not presented and remains 
unresolved in this circuit. We must therefore address it. See, 
e.g., Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207, 211 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (“[A] court of appeals has both the inherent 
authority and a continuing obligation to assess whether it has 
jurisdiction over a case or controversy before rendering a 
decision on the merits.”). 
2 
 Riverkeeper argues that we should follow Berkshire’s 
holding and read a finality requirement into § 717r(d)(1). 
Riverkeeper further argues that PADEP’s order is not final 
because Pennsylvania’s administrative scheme is analogous to 
Massachusetts’s. We need not rule on whether § 717r(d)(1) 
includes an unstated finality requirement. In either case, our 
jurisdiction is proper because the agency action here is 
administratively final. 
 “Our cases have interpreted pragmatically the requirement 
of administrative finality, focusing on whether judicial review 
at the time will disrupt the administrative process.” Bell, 461 
U.S. at 779. Final agency action “must mark the 
‘consummation’ of the agency’s decisionmaking process,” 
“must not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature,” and 
“must be one by which ‘rights or obligations have been 
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determined,’ or from which ‘legal consequences will flow.’” 
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997) (quoting 
Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 
333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948) and Port of Boston Marine Terminal 
Assn. v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71 
(1970)). 
 According to Riverkeeper, Pennsylvania’s administrative 
process does not reach a final conclusion until PADEP’s order 
has been reviewed by a separate administrative entity, the 
Environmental Hearing Board. In support of that proposition, 
Riverkeeper cites the Pennsylvania statute governing the 
Board’s jurisdiction: 
[N]o action of the department [PADEP4] 
adversely affecting a person shall be final as to 
that person until the person has had the 
opportunity to appeal the action to the board . . . . 
If a person has not perfected an appeal in 
accordance with the regulations of the board, the 
department’s action shall be final as to the 
person. 
                                                 
 4 Note that the statute defines “Department” as “The 
Department of Environmental Resources of the 
Commonwealth.” 35 P.S. § 7512. Nonetheless, the parties 
appear to agree that the statute applies to that agency’s more 
recent incarnation, the Department of Environmental 
Protection. See Texas Keystone Inc. v. Pa. Dep’t of 
Conservation & Nat. Res., 851 A.2d 228, 239 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 2004). 
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35 P.S. § 7514(c). Riverkeeper seizes on the first sentence to 
argue that there has been no “appeal . . . to the board,” id., and 
therefore the administrative process has not culminated in a 
final decision over which we may exercise jurisdiction. 
 Assuming (without deciding) that § 7514(c) controls 
appellate ripeness,5 the order in question is nonetheless final 
because Riverkeeper “has not perfected an appeal in 
accordance with the regulations of the board.” Id. The relevant 
regulation provides that an appeal to the Environmental 
Hearing Board must be filed within “[t]hirty days after the 
notice of the action has been published in the Pennsylvania 
Bulletin.” 25 Pa. Code § 1021.52(a)(2)(i). PADEP published 
notice on October 8, 2016. This petition was filed in March 
2017, and Riverkeeper did not take an appeal to the 
Environmental Hearing Board in the interim. Thus, PADEP’s 
order became “final” under 35 P.S. § 7514(c) in November 
                                                 
 5 Paradoxically, the Board appears to apply its own finality 
requirement that approximates the federal standard, 
notwithstanding § 7514(c). See Law v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 
No. 1071 C.D. 2008, 2009 WL 9096519, at *2 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. Jan. 23, 2009) (“[A] letter does not constitute an 
adjudication or a final decision or an appealable order from 
which an appeal can be taken from the Department to the 
Board.”); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Environmental 
Hearing Board, Practice and Procedure Manual at 6–7 (2015 
ed.) (citing multiple decisions for the proposition that the 
Board has jurisdiction “over final Department actions 
adversely affecting personal or property rights, privileges, 
immunities, duties, liabilities or obligations of a person”). 
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2016. See Com., Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Cromwell Twp., 32 
A.3d 639, 653 (Pa. 2011) (“[T]he failure to appeal within thirty 
days rendered DEP’s action final.”); Otte v. Covington Twp. 
Rd. Sup’rs, 650 A.2d 412, 414 (Pa. 1994); cf. Berkshire, 851 
F.3d at 108 (noting that the petitioners dual-filed by “filing a 
Notice of Claim for Adjudicatory Hearing,” and also “hedged 
their bets” by filing a petition before the First Circuit).6 
 Apart from § 7514(c), PADEP’s permits also bear the 
traditional hallmarks of final agency action. There is nothing 
left for the agency to do, and thus PADEP’s decision “mark[s] 
the ‘consummation’ of the agency’s decisionmaking process” 
and is not “of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature.” 
Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178 (quoting Chicago & Southern Air 
Lines, 333 U.S. at 113). Furthermore, its order is “one by which 
‘rights or obligations have been determined,’ [and] from which 
‘legal consequences will flow.’” Id. (quoting Port of Boston 
Marine Terminal Assn., 400 U.S. at 71). As each permit states, 
                                                 
 6 Riverkeeper objects, contending that PADEP’s order 
is not final because Riverkeeper may attempt to file an 
appeal nunc pro tunc before the Environmental Hearing 
Board. See 25 Pa. Code § 1021.53a; Twp. of Robinson v. 
Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No. 451 C.D. 2007, 2008 WL 
9405218, at *4 (Pa. Commw. Ct. July 3, 2008). But by that 
logic, a PADEP decision would never become final under 
the second sentence of § 7514(c). As the case comes 
before us, there has been no appeal to the Board, and in 
applying the text of § 7514(c), we do not think it would be 
appropriate to speculate about whether the Board would 
accept a nunc pro tunc appeal. 
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“This permit authorizes the construction, operation, 
maintenance and normal repair of the permitted structures.” JA 
36; JA 167; see Transcript of Oral Argument at 31:24–32:3 
(“When that permit issued and we had the approval of FERC 
. . . , we started construction . . . .”); NE Hub Partners, L.P. v. 
CNG Transmission Corp., 239 F.3d 333, 346 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(“Pa.D.E.P. permits are valid pending the E.H.B. outcome . . . 
.”); Com., Dep’t of Envtl. Res. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 367 
A.2d 222, 229 (Pa. 1976) (holding that jurisdiction existed to 
enforce a consent order issued by the Department despite a 
pending appeal before the Board seeking modification); cf. 
Berkshire, 851 F.3d at 108 (noting that construction could not 
begin until “the expiration of the Appeal Period set forth below 
and any appeal proceedings that may result from an appeal”). 
 Thus, by combination of § 7514(c) and the practical 
significance of PADEP’s permits, we conclude that we are 
reviewing final agency action. Our jurisdiction is proper 
regardless of whether the Natural Gas Act limits our review to 
final orders. We note, however, that there are cases pending 
before this Court where the petitioners dual-filed appeals 
before the Environmental Hearing Board. See, e.g., Docket 
Nos. 16-2212, 16-2218, 16-2400. Those actions ask this Court 
to review orders that are arguably nonfinal under § 7514(c). 
Whether the Natural Gas Act requires finality and how such a 
requirement would interact with Pennsylvania’s administrative 
scheme are issues better resolved in those cases. 
B 
 PADEP argues that, because Riverkeeper’s petition would 
be untimely before the Environmental Hearing Board, it is also 
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untimely before us. We reject that argument because the 
regulation governing appeals before the Environmental 
Hearing Board does not define the timeliness of petitions 
before this Court. 
 Under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
“[r]eview of an agency order is commenced by filing, within 
the time prescribed by law, a petition for review.” Fed. R. App. 
P. 15(a)(1) (emphasis added). “The procedures set forth in 
subsection (a) of Rule 15 are jurisdictional.” Wisniewski v. 
Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 
929 F.2d 952, 954 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 According to PADEP, “the time prescribed by law,” Fed. R. 
App. P. 15(a)(1), refers to the state regulatory provision that 
governs appeals from PADEP to the Environmental Hearing 
Board. As described above, the appeal must be filed within 
“[t]hirty days after the notice of the action has been published 
in the Pennsylvania Bulletin.” 25 Pa. Code § 1021.52(a)(2)(i). 
 But this is not an appeal before the Environmental Hearing 
Board, and the Board’s regulations are not binding on us. 
Rather, Rule 15 “defin[es] the time for filing a petition for 
review with reference to the statute providing for review of the 
agency’s orders.” United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 
417, 435 (5th Cir. 1987). That refers to Section 19(d) of the 
Natural Gas Act. See Islander E. Pipeline Co., LLC v. Conn. 
Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 482 F.3d 79, 83–84 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he 
NGA . . . provides an expedited direct cause of action in the 
federal appellate courts to challenge a state administrative 
agency’s order . . . .”). 
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 For appeals from FERC, the Natural Gas Act prescribes a 
sixty-day limitations period. See 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b). For 
appeals from other federal agencies and state agencies, 
however, the statute provides no limitation. See id. 
§ 717r(d)(1). Whether timeliness is governed by the four-year 
catchall limitations period established by 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a),7 
or laches, Schaefer v. NLRB, 697 F.2d 558, 560–61 (3d Cir. 
1983), we are unable to conclude that Riverkeeper filed its 
petition out of time. 
 Accordingly, jurisdiction is proper under the Natural Gas 
Act and under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
III 
 Turning to the merits, we review for arbitrary or capricious 
agency action. Del. Riverkeeper, 833 F.3d at 377.8 Riverkeeper 
argues that PADEP erred under that standard for two reasons. 
First, Riverkeeper argues that PADEP made an erroneous 
                                                 
 7 Although not raised by the parties, 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a) 
establishes a four-year limitations period for any “civil action 
arising under an Act of Congress enacted after” December 1, 
1990. See Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 
382 (2004); N. Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 34 n.* 
(1995). 
 8 The arbitrary-and-capricious standard derives from the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), which 
does not cover state agencies, see id. § 701(b)(1). Nonetheless, 
this court and others have applied that standard. See, e.g., Del. 
Riverkeeper, 833 F.3d at 377; Islander, 482 F.3d at 94. 
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“water dependency” finding. Second, Riverkeeper argues that 
PADEP erred by ruling out a “compression” alternative. We 
reject both arguments in turn. 
A 
 PADEP determined that the Orion Project is “water 
dependent.” According to Riverkeeper, that finding was 
erroneous because linear infrastructure projects (like pipelines 
and roads) are categorically not water dependent. PADEP 
acknowledges that, under federal law, Riverkeeper might be 
right. But under Pennsylvania law, PADEP argues, water 
dependency operates differently. We conclude that PADEP has 
provided a reasonable explanation for how its regulations 
differ, and we will defer to its interpretation. 
 Because the Orion Project would construct pipeline looping 
through “exceptional value” wetlands, 25 Pa. Code 
§ 105.17(1), PADEP cannot approve the project without first 
certifying that “[t]he project is water-dependent,” 25 Pa. Code 
§ 105.18a(a)(2). “A project is water-dependent when the 
project requires access or proximity to or siting within the 
wetland to fulfill the basic purposes of the project.” Id. 
 Riverkeeper thus argues, by reference to federal law, that 
pipelines and other types of linear infrastructure are 
categorically not water dependent. It relies on the following 
explanation of water dependency by a federal agency, the 
United States Army Corps of Engineers: 
[T]he purpose of a residential development is to 
provide housing for people. Houses do not have 
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to be located in a special aquatic site to fulfill the 
basic purpose of the project, i.e., providing 
shelter. Therefore, a residential development is 
not water dependent. . . . Examples of water 
dependent projects include, but are not limited 
to, dams, marinas, mooring facilities, and docks. 
The basic purpose of these projects is to provide 
access to the water. 
Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp, 709 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1261 (S.D. 
Fla. 2009) (quoting Army Corps of Engineers Standard 
Operating Procedures for the Regulatory Program (October 15, 
1999)), aff’d, 362 F. App’x 100 (11th Cir. 2010). Under that 
understanding, Riverkeeper argues that pipeline projects are 
not water dependent because, unlike a dam, marina, or dock, 
pipelines are not by their nature dependent on being in or near 
water—even if the desired construction path would cross a 
wetland or waterbody. See, e.g., Coastal Conservation League 
v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 4:16-cv-03008, 2016 WL 
6823375, at *14 (D.S.C. Nov. 18, 2016) (noting that a road 
project is not water dependent even though “expanding and 
improving the road cannot occur without impacting special 
aquatic sites”). 
 In the context of the federal regulatory scheme, that 
understanding of water dependency makes sense. If a project 
is water dependent, like a dam, it is impossible to construct 
without impacting an aquatic site. But if a project is not water 
dependent, “practicable alternatives that do not involve special 
aquatic sites are presumed to be available, unless clearly 
demonstrated otherwise.” 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(3). In other 
words, the agency will presume that the applicant can select a 
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different pipeline route or other alternative that does not affect 
an aquatic site. If the applicant rebuts that presumption, the 
project does not become “water dependent”; the applicant has 
simply met its burden under the regulation. In other words, the 
water-dependency finding comes first and the alternatives 
analysis comes second. 
 PADEP took a different approach. It observed that the 
proposed pipeline looping “needs to cross the wetland areas to 
access land on either side of the wetland system” because 
“there are no practicable crossing alternatives to avoid the 
crossing.” JA 49, 180. Indeed, “[l]inear infrastructure projects 
of any significant length proposed in Pennsylvania will 
encounter surface waters, including wetlands.” Resp. Br. 14. 
By rejecting alternatives to the Orion Project and observing the 
pipeline’s path would unavoidably traverse wetlands, PADEP 
concluded that the Orion Project is water dependent. Rather 
than treating water dependency and alternatives analysis as two 
distinct inquiries, PADEP combined them into one step. 
 Riverkeeper argues that the federal understanding of water 
dependency should control. The definition of water 
dependency in 25 Pa. Code § 105.18a(a)(2) is identical to its 
federal counterpart, 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(3); see also 25 Pa. 
Code § 105.18a(b)(3)(i) (“It shall be a rebuttable presumption 
that there is a practicable alternative, not involving a wetland, 
to a nonwater-dependent project, and that the alternative would 
have less adverse impact on the wetland.”). 
 PADEP responds that Riverkeeper’s emphasis on federal 
law is misplaced because PADEP relied on a regulatory 
provision unique to Pennsylvania: 
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(b) In reviewing a permit application under this 
chapter, the Department will use the 
following factors to make a determination of 
impact: 
. . . 
(7) The extent to which a project is water 
dependent and thereby requires access or 
proximity to or siting within water to fulfill 
the basic purposes of the project. The 
dependency must be based on the 
demonstrated unavailability of any 
alternative location, route or design and the 
use of location, route or design to avoid or 
minimize the adverse impact of the dam, 
water obstruction or encroachment upon the 
environment and protect the public natural 
resources of this Commonwealth. 
25 Pa. Code § 105.14(b)(7). This provision endorses a more 
flexible approach to water dependency. Contrary to 
Riverkeeper’s interpretation, this provision states that a water-
dependency finding “must be based on” the unavailability of 
“alternative[s]” and the project’s ability to “avoid or minimize 
the adverse impact of the . . . encroachment upon the 
environment.” Id. This language supports PADEP’s 
interpretation. As contemplated by § 105.14(b)(7), PADEP’s 
conclusion as to water-dependency was based on its finding 
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that no “alternative location, route or design” could avoid 
adverse impacts on aquatic sites and the environment. Id.9 
 In light of these conflicting provisions, we conclude that the 
meaning of “water dependent” in 25 Pa. Code § 105.18a(a)(2) 
is ambiguous. If we were reviewing an order of a federal 
agency, we would be required to defer to the agency’s 
reasonable interpretation of its own regulations. See Auer v. 
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1992). The question here is whether a 
state agency should receive similar deference. We conclude 
that such deference is appropriate. 
 Pennsylvania specifically recognizes Auer-style deference 
for its agencies. See, e.g., Buffalo Twp. v. Jones, 778 A.2d 1269, 
1276 n.8 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001) (“In reviewing an agency’s 
interpretation of . . . its own regulations, unless the language is 
clear, we are required to defer to the agency’s 
interpretation . . . .”), aff’d, 813 A.2d 659 (Pa. 2002). Nothing 
in the Natural Gas Act or our system of federalism compels us 
                                                 
 9 Riverkeeper attempts to downplay the significance of 25 
Pa. Code § 105.14(b)(7) by arguing that it was not cross-
referenced in the regulation at issue here, 25 Pa. Code 
§ 105.18a(a)(2) (establishing special protections for 
exceptional-value wetlands). But § 105.14(b)(7) is part of a 
general provision that governs “reviewing a permit application 
under this chapter.” The provision is thus arguably applicable 
even in the absence of an explicit cross-reference. Riverkeeper 
also objects that § 105.14(b)(7) favors its position because 
Tennessee Gas did not “demonstrate[]” the “unavailability” of 
the compression alternative. But that is a separate question that 
we will return to in the next section. 
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to strip a state agency of the deference it would otherwise 
receive in its own courts. This Court recognized similar 
deference in Barnes v. Cohen, which concluded that “the 
[Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare’s] interpretation 
of its own regulations is, of course, entitled to considerable 
deference. . . .  [H]owever, we need not accept the agency 
interpretation if it is ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation.’” 749 F.2d 1009, 1018 (3d Cir. 1984) (quoting 
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 
(1945)); accord Bldg. Trades Emp’rs’ Educ. Ass’n v. 
McGowan, 311 F.3d 501, 507 (2d Cir. 2002) (“We defer to 
a state agency’s interpretation of its own regulations, unless 
the interpretation is arbitrary or capricious.”).10 
 Applying that deferential standard, we conclude that 
PADEP’s interpretation of water dependency is reasonable. 
                                                 
 10 State agencies’ interpretations of federal law do not 
ordinarily receive deference. See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell 
Atl. Pa., 271 F.3d 491, 516 (3d Cir. 2001). But some federal 
courts have shown deference to state agencies’ interpretations 
of state law. See, e.g., Arizona v. City of Tucson, 761 F.3d 1005, 
1014 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Federal courts generally defer to 
a state agency’s interpretation of those statutes it is charged 
with enforcing, but not to its interpretation of federal statutes it 
is not charged with enforcing.”); City Of Bangor v. Citizens 
Commc’ns Co., 532 F.3d 70, 94 (1st Cir. 2008); Mich. Bell Tel. 
Co. v. MCIMetro Access Transmission Servs., Inc., 323 F.3d 
348, 357 (6th Cir. 2003); Enter. Leasing Co. v. Metro. Airports 
Comm’n, 250 F.3d 1215, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001). 
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 First, as noted above, PADEP’s flexible approach to water 
dependency is consistent with the text of 25 Pa. Code § 
105.14(b)(7). That provision appears to be unique to 
Pennsylvania and is fully compatible with PADEP’s 
interpretation. 
 Second, PADEP’s flexible approach to water dependency is 
public and longstanding. See, e.g., Barnhart v. Walton, 535 
U.S. 212, 220 (2002) (“[T]his Court will normally accord 
particular deference to an agency interpretation of 
‘longstanding’ duration.” (quoting North Haven Bd. of Ed. v. 
Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 522 n.12 (1982))). In 1991, when the 
relevant regulations were first promulgated, PADEP stated its 
intention to evaluate the water dependency of linear 
infrastructure projects on a case-by-case basis. For example, in 
response to a public comment, PADEP stated that “[r]oads may 
be considered water dependent on a case by case basis.” DEP 
Addendum 12; see also DEP Addendum 9 (“[T]he Department 
believes that haul roads, depending on their location, may be 
water dependent and will make that determination on a case by 
case basis.”). Such case-by-case analysis belies the categorical 
approach urged by Riverkeeper. 
 And third, water dependency plays a different role in 
Pennsylvania’s administrative scheme. Under the federal 
regulations, water dependency is a procedural consideration 
that affects the applicant’s burden. See 40 C.F.R. 
§ 230.10(a)(3). In Pennsylvania, water dependency is a 
substantive criterion that must be met in order to obtain certain 
Chapter 105 permits. See 25 Pa. Code § 105.18a(a)(2). Under 
Riverkeeper’s categorical approach, some projects might be 
impossible to approve even if they would be environmentally 
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harmless. It stands to reason that PADEP would retain 
discretion to approve projects, such as this one, where no 
alternatives would minimize or avoid adverse impacts on the 
environment pursuant to 25 Pa. Code § 105.14(b)(7). 
 Thus, we conclude that PADEP did not act arbitrarily or 
capriciously by incorporating an alternatives analysis as part of 
its water-dependency finding. While PADEP’s interpretation of 
water dependency appears to be unique, it is nonetheless 
reasonable in light of the text and structure of Pennsylvania’s 
regulatory scheme. We will therefore defer to PADEP’s 
interpretation and reject Riverkeeper’s categorical approach. 
B 
 Riverkeeper finally argues that, even if PADEP’s water-
dependency finding was not arbitrary or capricious, PADEP’s 
alternatives analysis was erroneous. Specifically, Riverkeeper 
asserts that PADEP was required to embrace a compression 
alternative. That alternative would have increased the amount 
of natural gas transported through existing pipelines—
avoiding all impacts on wetlands and waterbodies that would 
be caused by constructing new pipeline looping. We conclude, 
however, that PADEP considered the compression alternative 
and rejected it for reasons supported by the record. 
 In addition to certifying that the project is water dependent, 
PADEP must also certify that “[t]here is no [1] practicable 
alternative to the proposed project that [2] would not involve a 
wetland or that would have less effect on the wetland, and [3] 
not have other significant adverse effects on the environment.” 
25 Pa. Code § 105.18a(a)(3). That standard is almost identical 
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to its federal counterpart, 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a), which we 
discussed at length in the companion case Delaware 
Riverkeeper Network v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, No. 17-
1506 (3d Cir. 2017). There, we held that the United States 
Army Corps of Engineers did not arbitrarily or capriciously 
reject the compression alternative because the agency 
reasonably concluded that the compression alternative would 
have “other significant adverse effects on the environment.” 40 
C.F.R. § 230.10(a). We will uphold PADEP’s decision for the 
same reason. 
 The compression alternative would “us[e] gas- and electric-
powered turbines to increase the pressure and rate of flow at 
given points along the pipeline’s route.” Del. Riverkeeper, 833 
F.3d at 369.11 As part of its application to PADEP, Tennessee 
Gas included an alternatives analysis that rejected that 
approach. Tennessee Gas stated that “adding a new (greenfield) 
compressor station would require Tennessee [Gas] to obtain 
approximately 40-acres per site,” and that construction “would 
require permanent vegetation clearing from the area in order to 
install permanent access roads, fencing, buildings and other 
appurtenance equipment . . . resulting in increased impacts to 
the environment.” JA 266, 279. Tennessee Gas also observed 
that “a new (greenfield) compressor station would be an 
                                                 
 11 The parties focus primarily on building one or more new 
compressor stations rather than upgrading an existing station. 
See Del. Riverkeeper Network v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 
No. 17-1506, slip op. at 6 n.3 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[U]pgrades to 
existing compressor stations, without looping, did not offer the 
same reliability and flexibility on the system.”). We focus our 
analysis accordingly. 
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aboveground facility with light pollution and noise impacts and 
may also become a source of [greenhouse gas] emissions.” Id. 
In contrast to those permanent environmental impacts, the land 
affected by construction “will be allowed to re-vegetate to 
minimize and mitigate possible environmental impacts.” Id.; 
see JA 38 (“All disturbed wetland areas are to be restored to 
the original contours and shall be replanted with indigenous 
plant species.”); JA 39 (“The permittee shall monitor the 
restored wetland areas within the ROW for a minimum of three 
growing seasons . . . .”). 
 While PADEP did not explicitly mention compression in its 
alternatives analysis, it did consider “System Alternatives,” 
i.e., alternatives that make use of existing transportation 
systems. JA 45, 176. Compression is one type of system 
alternative. See JA 294. PADEP also adopted Tennessee Gas’s 
reasoning as its own: “The Department has reviewed 
[Tennessee Gas’s] report and finds no cause to disagree with 
the conclusions and final alternative presented.” Id. 
 As part of a checklist reflecting the criteria for approving 
projects that would affect exceptional-value wetlands, PADEP 
certified that the Orion Project is “the least environmentally 
damaging alternative.” JA 49, 180. In support of that 
conclusion, PADEP references its alternatives analysis, which 
in turn adopted Tennessee Gas’s reasoning. As discussed at 
length in the federal companion case, the agency’s statement 
amounts to a judgment that the permanent environmental 
impacts from the compression alternative are “significant.” See 
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (“We will . . . uphold a decision of 
less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be 
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discerned.” (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best 
Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974))).12 
 Accordingly, we conclude that PADEP did not arbitrarily or 
capriciously disregard the compression alternative. 
IV 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will uphold PADEP’s 
decision to issue the Chapter 105 permits and deny the petition 
for review. 
                                                 
 12 The permanent, “significant” environmental impacts of 
the compression alternative reasonably establish 
“demonstrated unavailability” under 25 Pa. Code 
§ 105.14(b)(7). See supra note 9. PADEP’s statement that there 
are no “practicable crossing alternatives,” JA 49, 180, does not 
imply that its decision was based purely on costs or logistics. 
Rather, it reflects a judgment that “certain avoidance measures 
were not feasible because they were determined not to be as 
environmentally sound.” JA 25; see also JA 141, 321 
(discussing “other environmental impact considerations”). 
That approach is consistent with § 105.14(b)(7) and thus not 
arbitrary or capricious. 
